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Bin Laden's War
DAVID A. WESTBROOKt
INTRODUCTION
War is a collective action. In order to fight together,
people must be organized. Each side in a war, including this
"Global War on Terror" (GWOT, as the military jargon has
it) or "Global Jihad," thus expresses a politics. The Western
tradition provides many examples of militarized politics.
The United Nations Charter is structured around the
notion of the modern state governing a well-defined
territory, and most of the writings of the seminal military
theorist Clausewitz are based on a similar imagination of
the belligerents. While the Charter seeks to outlaw war
(except as authorized by the Security Council or in self-
defense), and Clausewitz sought to explicate war's logic, for
both, war is a more or less rational expression of a
sovereign state's policy. But this is hardly the only way to
imagine the politics so dramatically expressed by war. An
older European tradition conceived of war on the model of a
duel between monarchs, who can fight with the resources of
their lands. Thucydides is often loosely cited in support of
"realist" theories of interstate relations, but for Thucydides,
war, at least within the Hellenic world, seemed to be
essentially akin to civil war or even feud, a matter of
allegiance and betrayal in which claims on loyalty and for
violence were fluid, as exemplified most perfectly by
Alcibiades, who variously fought for and against Athens. If
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wars are informed by a politics, we are driven to ask, what
politics constitute al Qaeda's terrorism?
I. CONCEPTUAL DIFFICULTIES
It has been widely remarked that this war is
structurally asymmetric. On the one side, the GWOT is
prosecuted by states, primarily the United States,
sometimes acting in concert with each other. On the other
side, terrorist organizations or networks, preeminently al
Qaeda but others, too, wage Global Jihad. States appear,
but occasionally and in the supporting role of sponsors; the
violence emanates from what are bureaucratically called
non-state actors. As the awkwardness of "non-state"
suggests, the asymmetry of this conflict presents practical
problems for the fighters. Who are "the terrorists"? For that
matter, who are the enemies of the ummah (community of
believers) against whom jihad may be waged? Such
questions are anything but abstract. Enemies must be
identified, understood at least deeply enough to be
recognized, in order to be fought. Although wars may be
fought between sides organized in different ways and
therefore called "asymmetric," the activity of warfare is
structured by the division between friend and enemy and
therefore is profoundly symmetric, a symmetry neatly
expressed by the old image of war as a duel. Thus, to say
that this war is structurally asymmetric suggests a basic
problem: the situation must be constantly recast, the
ensemble bifurcated into enemies and others, in order to
achieve the symmetry required for the conduct of war.
While perhaps necessary for purposes of political and
military organization, incessant redescription is unlikely to
result in clear understanding or well-informed policy. As
Clausewitz taught, immediate tactical imperatives may
obscure long-term strategic objectives. In this case, our
need to identify "the terrorists" requires constant
reimagination, and so reconstitution, of our enemies. Very
bluntly put, the question, who may be targeted? must be
constantly reasked. The moral, political, and hence
strategic risks of constantly redefining one's enemies, and
so the war, are obvious, yet that hardly makes the
problem-how do we imagine, describe, and so define our
enemies?-disappear.
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By treating states who harbor terrorists as enemy
states, the "Bush doctrine" (as announced against
Afghanistan, but also employed with regard to Iraq and,
diplomatically, Libya and Syria) has attempted to give
modern militaries, organized by and around territorial
states with bureaucratic command structures, a
homologous opponent-another state. Yet despite the Bush
doctrine, the present conflict cannot be encompassed by the
traditional grammar of international relations among
states. The presence of al Qaeda operatives in Germany,
Great Britain, and of course here in the United States has
not led to war on those places, and whatever worries about
the reduction of civil liberties are warranted, martial law
has not been declared. The nature of the present conflict in
such places requires an imagination centered on something
besides the state.
But the habit of understanding war as an activity of the
state-and therefore, explaining violence in terms of a
raison d'etat-dies hard. The law of war over the last few
hundred years has been conceived in terms of cross border
conflicts. (The International Court of Justice in the recent
Israeli wall case, over an objection by Judge Rosalyn
Higgins, repeated the proposition that wars are waged by
states.) From this rather ethnocentric understanding of
war, it has been maintained that al Qaeda is not a state,
and therefore al Qaeda's violence does not constitute a war.
Instead of war, we are confronted with large scale violent
crime. This, indeed, was more or less the US government's
position up until 9/11. Versions of this argument are still
presented by human rights advocates, who seek to use the
rights afforded criminal defendants to limit the powers of
governments, especially that of the United States.
Without denying that terrorist acts are crimes, or that
the methods of law enforcement are invaluable in waging
the present conflict, or that the powers of governments
should be limited, it seems perversely formalistic to claim
that only collective violence organized among states
deserves the appellation "war." There are many ways of
organizing people to fight collectively; not all such forms of
organization are states. This is an age not only of terrorism,
but of ethnic violence, even genocide, and of slaughter in
places where states have failed. Are such affairs not wars?
For his part, bin Laden has always called this conflict a
war. And after 9/11, the sheer violence of the attacks, the
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scale of the sometimes classical military responses
(invasion, regime change), and the understanding that
terrorism, perhaps coupled with WMD technology, is the
central security concern of the present time, makes it
impossible to consider this conflict exclusively in terms
familiar from criminal law enforcement. Bin Laden has a
war, and he has the bodies to prove it.
Even Westerners who understand this conflict as a war,
albeit one not between states, often implicitly imagine
warfare as an activity of a state-like entity, presumed to be
"rational" in familiar ways. When they seek to rationalize
violence by speaking of the purposes of the terrorists, in
effect searching for a raison d'etat, Westerners generally
presume that this conflict is undertaken according to
familiar political logics. And post hoc rationalizations for
terrorist violence can always be found; indeed
rationalizations are often suggested by terrorists
themselves. So it is variously said that terrorist violence is
motivated by the victim's support for Israel, or the invasion
of Afghanistan or Iraq, or the stationing of troops in Saudi
Arabia, or by the worldwide conspiracy against Islam in
general. Terrorists can thus be understood to be carrying
forth a political program through violent means (all
terrorists read Clausewitz).
For those trying to understand Global Jihad, non-
Muslims and Muslims alike, this can be a deeply comforting
view of the situation, not just a lack of imagination. From
this perspective, the logic of war is that of ordinary politics,
if perhaps pursued through extraordinary means, and
therefore, if we wipe away the blood, violence can be
understood as if it were just another political argument.
Terrorists have their grievances; that is why they become
terrorists. Such "arguments" can easily be abstracted and
rendered anodyne. Al Qaeda's violence is often discussed in
terms familiar from Western political discourse: anti-
imperialism, national self-determination, the resentment
bred by poverty, and so forth. The various consequences of
violent acts are thus domesticated, even obscured entirely,
by the translation of violence into familiar political
language.
The comfort such translations might bring, however, is
not without costs for the imagination and so conduct of
policy. If violence is just primitive political argument, then
achievement of their political objectives would make
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violence unnecessary for the terrorists. Rather stark
strategic choices are thus presented: the war may be ended
by the identification and incapacitation of the terrorists, or
by some form of conversion (Americans should recall the
battle for the "hearts and minds" of the Vietnamese people),
or by some form of accommodation. But if al Qaeda is not
like a state, and if its violence is not like an argument, then
this mode of policy analysis is deeply wrongheaded,
ethnocentric in the worst way.
Ethnocentricity is difficult to avoid, and it may be
merely human to translate the shocking into familiar
terms. For example, after the attacks of June 7th, 2005,
Londoners recalled World War II, in which "freedom" was
pitted against "tyranny." In response, Londoners again
bravely vowed not to be intimidated. But were matters so
simple as an opposition between the pleasures of freedom
and the horrors of tyranny, an organized enemy would not
even exist. Confronted with violence, we utter banal
generalities, and then repeat ourselves. We often insist that
the strange is in fact familiar, that we already understand
what is actually shocking, like the fact that the huge twin
towers are not there any more. So the Bush doctrine insists
that states are responsible for war, as they have been
traditionally; so terrorists are presumed to understand
their violence in terms familiar from Clausewitz, as policy
by other means; and so al Qaeda is compared to the Nazis.
While one must sympathize, one must also realize that such
longing for the comfort of familiar thinking and rhetoric is
likely to obscure what is important about the new and
strange.
The tacit refusal to confront the new is nowhere more
clear than in the Bush administration's "war on terror,"
recalling wars on other abstractions, drugs, poverty, and
crime. Like those other wars, the war on terror seems
somewhat unwinnable, sort of a war on unhappiness, to be
specified by the commitments of the speaker. Predictably
enough, rather old arguments about the nature of
happiness and the purposes of government have been
updated for the current situation. For example, liberals
have maintained that we should get after the "root causes"
of terrorism, in short, poverty. But nobody really believes
that poverty per se caused the conspiracy to knock down the
twin towers. After all, the enterprise cost too much money.
Conversely, too many poor people are not violent. At least
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so far, the desperately poor and deeply Muslim country of
Bangladesh has produced few if any international
terrorists. From within the discourse of partisan politics in
the United States, however, such objections matter little:
"poverty" is simply a placeholder within well-rehearsed
arguments. The discussion of the strange, al Qaeda's
terrorism, continually risks degenerating into a repetition
of the familiar, for instance, a debate on the possibility of
the Great Society.
Well-rehearsed arguments are difficult to evaluate in
part because they often address real concerns. So poverty
matters. Many people are oppressed by others, or by
history, or by circumstance. Energy policy is important, and
so is decolonialization, and the creation and conduct of
Israel, and any number of despotic regimes, and not to
forget the history of U.S. involvement in the region . . .
blood flows, and much has been lost. People have their
grievances and their justifications, and are in the habit of
repeating them at appropriate junctures, but when are such
complaints really at the heart of violence? Particularly
when one has heard the same thing many times before, one
must ask whether the speaker expresses anything, or are
such arguments a noisy form of silence? Nor can security
policy be expected to wait for the elimination of poverty or
even the rectification of border issues. Thus this Essay will
proceed by cabining what might broadly be called
economics, history, and sociology (academic techniques for
explaining what people really mean), in order to try and
take al Qaeda seriously.
The difficulty of thinking more forthrightly about what
al Qaeda represents is not simply due to the tendency to
take refuge in habitual patterns of thought, nor even just
because thinking anew is hard. Thinking about enemies is a
psychologically and morally difficult enterprise, especially
in this case, in which a hateful intolerance is a real danger.
The administration's "war on terror" is a disingenuous
phrase, but perhaps good manners. When the Madrid
bombings were blamed on the Basque separatists known as
ETA, nobody argued that such people were not capable of
terrorist acts. But, we all know, ETA is not a participant in
"the war on terror." "Terror," in contemporary parlance, is a
euphemism for something Islamic, something that is
difficult to name without seeming to be an enemy of Islam,
and hence of one of the world's great religions, and the
[Vol. 54986
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roughly one billion people, most peaceable and many fellow
citizens, who adhere to that faith. Yet even while such
divisions are resisted, whether al Qaeda is understood as
"the terrorists" or as the vanguard of the ummah, a growing
sense of polarity, of us and them, is palpable. As much as
anything else, it is this polarity that makes talk of war
unavoidable. But the word "terror" gives us little purchase
on what constitutes the enemy, and therefore "terror" does
not help us understand the nature of this conflict,
notwithstanding its horrible accuracy. "Radical Islamist" is
slightly more candid, suggesting something somehow
Islamic, but also radical, that is, different from most forms
of Islam. But different how?
Not that everyone is so squeamish. One increasingly
hears very direct questions about "the" relationship
between "Islam" and "violence," as if both concepts were so
neatly defined that an answer could be provided quickly.
Some speakers, even non-believers, go further, and argue
that Islam has been hijacked, and needs to be "recovered."
(How a non-believer would go about recovering someone
else's religion is difficult to imagine.) On the fringes, one
hears claims that Islam is inherently terrorist (and in
rebuttal, similar claims about the horrors justified by the
Bible), or that religion per se is the cause of violence in an
otherwise rational world (forgetting the wars fought in the
name of Enlightenment).
However primitive and sometimes even ill-intentioned,
such questions are a step in the right direction, because
they may begin an inquiry into the politics that constitute
al Qaeda's terrorism. Such inquiry is made difficult,
however, by the variety of violent politics with which we are
confronted. While this Essay has used "Global War on
Terror" and "Global Jihad" as mirror images, the terms are
not really symmetrical. The security risks and conflicts
addressed under the rubric of the GWOT include a great
deal of violence that is conceptually (and often practically)
distinct from bin Laden's idea of Global Jihad. There is no
single description of potential enemies that encompasses
U.S. security concerns, even if the discussion is limited to
"the Middle East" or "the Muslim world," however such
terms might be defined. Radical neofundamentalism is not
the only politics at issue in the present conflicts. Much
violence is local rather than global. Much violence is
motivated by rather old-fashioned nationalism, or by
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tribalism of a seemingly archaic sort, or by contemporary
reconfigurations of ancient tribes, or by solidarity groups
smaller than tribes, or by banditry, or by explicitly Islamic
politics quite different from bin Laden's. Nor are such forms
of organization discrete: a warrior's heart may hold
multiple, overlapping loyalties, whatever analysts may say.
In short, there is no single paradigm-comparable to the
nation for nineteenth century Europe-that adequately
describes the politics of the many conflicts that comprise
the GWOT.
Among these various ways of organizing people to fight,
however, the Global Jihad offered by bin Laden is different
from prior wars, not only in the West, but in the Islamic
world as well. Global Jihad is different in kind from conflict
as imagined by Clausewitz or others who seek to explain
war as an instrument of the state, including those who
understand this war simply negatively (and
ethnocentrically) as the consequence of misbegotten policies
of the United States and other Western powers. Nor can
Global Jihad be conceptualized in tribal or other traditional
terms. Bin Laden and other radical neofundamentalists
have presented us with a new and unfamiliar kind of
politics, and hence of war, and appreciating these
differences is a prerequisite to an informed policy.
II. BACKGROUND: ISLAMIC IMAGINATIONS OF POLITICS
Some understanding of what is new here requires some
attention to what is old. To understand what makes bin
Laden's politics, and hence his war, so different, it is helpful
to sketch four different understandings of the relationship
between Islam and political life, including warfare, that
have been widely held among Muslims: (i) the Islamic
politics of the Prophet and the right-guided caliphs; (ii) the
diffident and somewhat judgmental relationship between
Islamic discourse and everyday political life in the Muslim
tradition stretching from shortly after the days of the
Prophet to the present; (iii) the political Islam that arose in
the twentieth century; and (iv) the contemporary, even
postmodern, neofundamentalism that has emerged in
recent years. Al Qaeda draws from, and must also be
distinguished from, each of these understandings of Islamic
politics and hence warfare.
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It must be stressed that this is only a sketch, and an
amateurish one at that. I am an emphatically Western
academic, even if I have a longstanding interest in matters
Islamic. But my topic here is not Islam or even bin Laden's
war per se, but how such distant concepts may be-indeed
inevitably must be-appropriated by policy elites, and made
the objects of political dispute, especially in my own nation.
And I believe it safe to say that, while the understanding of
Islamic political paradigms offered here is a simplification,
perhaps even primitive, my views are considerably more
sophisticated than the imaginations that inform the vast
majority of U.S. policy discourse on the subject. Rephrased,
foreign policy is inevitably based upon misapprehensions,
journalism rather than history, but must be undertaken
nonetheless.
A. The First Understanding (the Time of the Prophet)
The Prophet, his companions, and his immediate
successors are believed to have conducted political life in
perfect accordance with the law (sharia). Sunnis, Twelver
Shi'ites and Ismailis disagree on which successors, and so
how long this period lasts, but all believe that accounts of
the actions of the Prophet and companions (hadith),
including political actions, are believed to be both sources of
and guides to the nature of the law. In the same vein, the
ummah is said (at least by Sunnis) to be incapable of
making a mistake. Thus, with regard to the very early days,
it makes little sense to speak of a relationship between
Islam and political life, that is, to understand one as
separable from the other. Islam encompassed political life;
political life exemplified Islam.
B. The Second Understanding (Rulers and Scholars)
For those who are not the Prophet or immediately
connected to him, that is, people who have lived in the
ensuing centuries, the relationship between politics and
Islam is much less clear. Islam is believed to inform all
aspects of right living, and sharia is perfect, eternal.
Politics, in the sense of ruling or administration, in
contrast, is essentially bound in time. Those in authority
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must make practical decisions, often based upon imperfect
information and in bad circumstances. While such political
decisions (siyassa) have the force of law, they cannot claim
to have the authority of the law, sharia.
Traditionally, then, Muslim societies exhibit a tension
akin to the Western tension between positive law (the will
of the ruler, especially as embodied in legal texts) and
justice (as determined by God or nature). This tension may
be reflected in the structure of Muslim societies, in which
different authorities rely on different aspects of the law.
The ruler has his officials, whose actions constitute siyassa.
Ulema, scholars of Islamic law who are also judges (qadis),
rule in accordance with sharia. Ideally, each respects the
authority of the other. Officials do not contravene sharia,
and may even consult ulema. But ulema have no power to
set policy or otherwise bind the government, although they
may condemn bad acts committed by the government.
Instead, the ulema must hope that the ruler is a good
Muslim. The language of politics is, at the end of the day,
not the clearest language of God. (Analogies in the West
may be found in Augustinian and Lutheran traditions of
political thought, with their insistence on the incomplete
nature of political life, and in the strong distinction between
policy and law.)
One should not overdo this distinction. The issue is
contested, but nothing so absolute as a distinction between
politics and religion, or separation between the state and
the church, need be implied. In many Muslim societies,
Islam permeates life, including political and so military life.
In wars with the infidel, an explicitly Islamic discourse may
prevail. For example, the Ottoman Empire's struggle with
the Allies in World War I was characterized as a jihad, a
holy war. Moreover, within Muslim societies, calls for
reform-efforts to make society more Islamic-have
occurred throughout history, most famously the salafi
movement that began with al Wahhab in the eighteenth
century. Such reform efforts have often been
"fundamentalist" in character, i.e., they insisted on the
primacy of the Koran and the ways of the Prophet, and
were antagonistic to accretions of culture and tradition in
the intervening years. Albeit in very different ways, the
mystical Sufi movements sought to imbue everyday life
with a greater sense of religious moment, and in doing so,
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to dissolve the bounds between the transcendent and the
banal.
While wars, fundamentalist reforms, and mystical
movements from time to time affirmed the Islamic nature of
all human life, including politics, the very extraordinary
nature of such developments testifies to the status quo
normal, in which policy and the institutions of
administrative governance, on the one hand, are readily
distinguishable from less worldly forms of life, including
scholarship and the judiciary, on the other hand. Asked
explicitly, Muslims might deny any distinction between
Islam and politics, and hence any distinction between
church and state on the Western model. This is true, in its
way, but as already suggested, a simplification somewhat
likely to mislead. If all authority is ultimately from God,
then no area can simultaneously claim to be ungodly and
authoritative. So Muslim rulers rule in the name of Islam,
because no other form of rule is Islamically authoritative.
That said, the distinctions between policy and law, siyassa
and sharia, administration and judiciary, temporal power
and atemporal authority, were central in both the early
Caliphate and in the Ottoman Empire, and remain
important in many places today, like contemporary Saudi
Arabia. Such times and places (and this view is, historically
and geographically speaking, the norm) should not be
understood as monolithically theocratic, as they often are.
Perhaps as a result of this distinction between
politically acceptable and more strictly religious ways of
life, many Muslim societies have historically been quite
tolerant of other faiths (especially "peoples of the book,"
Christians and Jews, and in India, Hindus), who were of
course in error but hardly threats to the established order.
Less happily, the separation between religious and
governmental authorities, combined with Islam's near
monopoly on public legitimacy, may tend to make
authoritative political criticism-and hence the legal or
even moral restraint of government-difficult. Political
exigency all too often serves as a blanket justification for
the actions of Muslim governments. More subtly, Islamic
thought has tended to be less institutional than many
contemporary Western minds (impressed, at least since the
French and American Revolutions, with the
institutionalization of political aspirations) easily
understand.
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C. The Third Understanding (Political Islam).
It is necessary to understand the diffidence of
traditional Islamic thought towards the institutions of
government in order to have some sense of the radicalism of
twentieth-century Islamic political thought. Hasan al-
Banna, Abul-Ala Maududi, the radical Sayyid Qutb, and
others founded organizations (including the Muslim
Brotherhood in Egypt and the Jama'at-i Islami in India)
and developed a discourse that was simultaneously frankly
Islamic and devoted to worldly political goals, and generally
conducted outside the ranks of ulema. In this view, which
French scholar Olivier Roy calls "political Islam," the
creation of an Islamic state is the very mechanism of
salvation, as opposed to the traditional view in which the
state is to be endured, although the Islamic virtue of the
ruler was desirable. For political Islam, religion is no longer
to be thought of as compromised by political life. Instead of
tolerance for the status quo, the way people live together-
politics in the broadest sense-should be transformed so
that Islam is realized here and now. Islam provides a
worldview, a vocabulary, a logic, and ultimate authority for
political action. Politics is to be subordinated to the
demands of Islam; Islam must leave the confines of the
mosque and transform the street, the market, the home,
and most of all, the government.
Like Marxism in the nineteenth century, twentieth-
century political Islam was a conceptual breakthrough, a
new way of thinking, talking about, and so doing politics.
Its radicalism was obscured from the West for a number of
reasons, including, of course, simple lack of interest,
language, distance and other barriers, and the tendency of
scholars to combine engagement with objectification that is
today criticized under the banner of Orientalism. Less
obviously, Western political theory has tended, since the
nineteenth century, to be deeply secular, and political Islam
is an explicitly theological discourse, even if often not
conducted by theologians. Moreover, understanding what
was so radical about the emergence of political Islam
requires some understanding of what had gone before, in
particular, in the traditional relationship between siyassa
and sharia, between the ruler and the ulema. For whatever
reasons, however, the fact remains that a revolutionary
discourse was invented and promulgated among millions of
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people across continents without drawing substantial
intellectual attention from Western policy elites until
Khomeni's seizure of power in Iran.
Political Islam provided the conceptual and emotional
resources to address the desire for modern forms of social
and political organization that, in the Arab world and
elsewhere, were often couched in the language of Marxism,
but without having to disavow God-indeed, with God's
authority. To some extent political Islam was a Muslim
alternative to the avowedly atheistic grammar of Marxism.
From this perspective, it is perhaps unsurprising that
Marxism and political Islam share a great deal. Both
discourses can be used to address local issues while
simultaneously claiming that local developments are part of
a grand progression. And in using a universal discourse to
articulate national, even local, political programs, political
Islam has traced a path roughly parallel to that taken by
Marxism, which is as a philosophical matter a theory of
world history, but which in practice became the rhetoric of
national political movements. In practice, political Islam,
like Marxism, became a language of nationalist politics
phrased internationally.
The success of political Islam has been considerable.
Political Islam became the governing ideology in
Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan, and most recently Palestine and
arguably Lebanon, and the dominant ideology of protest
among Muslims throughout North Africa and the Middle
East, in many places threatening the government, and can
be heard across Asia. Yet for all its revolutionary
significance, Roy maintains that political Islam has failed
in some important ways. Islamic revolutions in Afghanistan
and Iran have disappointed the victorious revolutionaries.
The regime was changed, but politics proceeded too much as
before. Islamic revolutions tend to become something else,
and delegitimate themselves. This is not particularly
Islamic; violent efforts to transform society in accordance
with transcendent ideals are likely to be disappointing.
(Hannah Arendt famously commented that the American
revolution was the only one that went at all well, perhaps
because its aims were somewhat modest and its situation,
on a rich yet thinly populated continent, was special.)
As a system of thought, political Islam has not found a
way to address the obdurate mundanity of political life,
except by condemnation. Despite contemporary efforts at
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reform, political Islam currently has little way to articulate
the sources, meanings, and significance of government or
politics writ large other than Islam. When political life fails
to measure up to the exhortations of Islam, as it must,
there is little to be said but to condemn the failings of those
involved. Rephrased, political Islam has had great difficulty
generating a political discourse that can be meaningfully
distinguished from moral discourse. As a result, political
Islam is an inadequate language for articulating, or
legitimating, institutional life. Politics and institutions still
happen, of course, but they do so in ways that cannot be
said in authoritative fashion. Much of politics is therefore
less than legitimate. Specifically, the dominance of political
Islam makes it very difficult to legitimate a modern state-
or international law, especially that of human rights-in
many places where Western secularism is seen as an
unholy imposition, un-Islamic.
D. The Fourth Understanding (Neofundamentalism)
Roy's claim that political Islam has failed, however,
reflects a specific if widely held understanding of what
politics is, namely, the construction and maintenance of a
modern state and its impersonal institutions. This is hardly
unfair. To establish modern yet Islamic states was, after
all, the stated intention of the founders of political Islam. In
a global society, however, establishing a modern state is not
the only and may not be the most important way to
understand political life. Indeed, political Islam has
spectacularly succeeded in other senses of the word
"politics." As mentioned, political Islam remains the
dominant discourse in countries inhabited by millions of
people. Political Islam has shown its fitness in ideological
struggle. While aspects of Marxism and secular Arab
nationalism have been incorporated, political Islam has
largely supplanted these discourses. Conflicts that were not
formerly conceived in Islamist terms now are. Consider the
Islamization of the Palestinian struggle, and more recently,
the Islamization of much Iraqi politics. Political Islam has
thus shown itself quite capable of being "political" in the
essential if horrible sense used by Carl Schmitt: the
discourse can be used to organize people to kill other people.
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Thus the failure of political Islam to achieve its
modernist aims, viz., the creation of a modern yet Islamic
state, hardly represents the end of Islamic politics. In
abandoning the narrowly political, in the sense of
governmental, understanding of the role of Islam in social
life, political Islam has given rise to the quite different
politics of neofundamentalism. Just as political Islam
addresses the need to operate as Muslim in the modern
world configured by states, neofundamentalism provides a
way to be Muslim in a global society.
Like other religions, neofundamentalist Islam has
become intensely contemporary by disentangling itself from
the matrix of social relations, tradition, and location
collectively referred to as "culture" in the old
anthropological sense of the set of meanings and folkways
that were to be found among a people who lived in a place.
Instead, the contemporary Muslim may adhere to one's
religion among strangers, in large cities, as an immigrant,
precisely because the religion has been pared down to its
essentials, a code. The neofundamentalist insistence on the
essential requirements of the Koran, which can be practiced
most anywhere, serves to make Islam transportable. Islam
is where the believer-defined as one who has learned and
attempts to follow the code-is.
Believers who come together need share very little
beyond the code. Hence, neofundamentalist Islamic society
is not "culture" in the traditional anthropological sense.
Because neofundamentalist Islamic politics is comprised by
believers, there is little need for territory, universal
jurisdiction, and other apparatus of the state. Believers
may form a community in the flux of great metropolises,
even in non-Muslim societies, as throughout Muslim
Europe. Neofundamentalist Islam produces a distinct, and
minimalist, understanding of politics, and one diametrically
opposed to that of political Islam, precisely on the question
of the state. Where political Islam saw the state as the
mechanism for the Islamicization of society, in the
neofundamentalist view, there is no need to overthrow
existing political regimes and establish an Islamic
administration. The state can wait. When the worldwide
community of believers is sufficiently inclusive, then
society, indeed all societies, will be Islamic. The ummah
then will be in practice as it has always been in principle,
universal, and the question of the role of Islam in political
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life with which this Essay has been concerned will dissolve,
as in the days of the Prophet. Until then, a politics which
understands itself in terms of a code, easily transportable
and transmittable without the institutions of the state,
functions quite well in the deterritorialized exchanges of
global society. Thus, while its substance may seem archaic
to Westerners, neofundamentalist Islam is in fact well
suited to contemporary circumstances, highly modern, even
postmodern, rather than archaic.
III. GLOBAL JIHAD
Consider the following possibility: bin Laden has
learned how to express the politics of neofundamentalist
Islam violently, through declaring Global Jihad. Indeed, bin
Laden has made such violence, rather than mere religious
practice, constitutive of a network (al Qaeda), a loose polity,
without significantly encumbering the polity by locating it
geographically or giving it a burdensome institutional
structure. Indeed the polity is so unencumbered that it may
be better considered "virtual," as an ideology-a code-that
can be replicated at any time or place the conditions allow.
And finally, consider the possibility that the relationship of
politics to violence within this ideology, the way violence is
encoded, is different from the relationship of politics to
violence in a bureaucratic nation state, or in the cadres of a
separatist movement, or even in political Islam, which
endeavors to seize control of the mechanisms of the state,
thereby acquiring responsibility.
To consider what such an understanding of al Qaeda
might mean for strategy in the Global War on Terror, we
need to specify the content of Global Jihad. But three
prefatory points need to be emphasized.
First, a war against Global Jihad is a war against its
underlying ideology, militarized radical neofundamentalism.
The remainder of this Essay will analyze the strategic
consequences of fighting a war against an ideology, and this
ideology in particular. Ideas are intangible, and while the
violence is real enough, this war has been dematerialized to
an extent never before seen. There are fighters, but no
military. There are locations, but no capital, no front, no
combat zone.
996 [Vol. 54
BIN LADEN'S WAR
Second, the extent to which Global Jihad accurately
explains contemporary Islamist violence is difficult to
assess empirically, and will remain so. "Why do people
fight" is rarely a simple question. At some level, however,
the empirical question is not only unanswerable (the
subject of future dissertations), but moot. Global Jihad is
clearly important. Regardless of the form and extent of
belief in Global Jihad that motivates this or that individual
terrorist, the ideology is loose upon the world, is indeed the
center of the Global War on Terror, and hence requires
analysis by the security community.
Third, the description of Global Jihad presented here is
rather stylized, too schematic, and overly rigid. Ideologies
tend to be mixed and sloppy. People change ideas, and hold
mutually conflicting ideas at the same time. This, as
discussed below, is an opportunity.
So, returning to the question with which this Essay
began: what politics constitute al Qaeda's terrorism? Bin
Laden's war expresses a radicalized neofundamentalism,
which preaches that the failure to establish a global
ummah is not due to the limitations of political Islam as a
discourse, as suggested above, or for some other internal
reason. Instead, the establishment of the global ummah has
been blocked by nonbelievers, i.e., by those outside the
ummah (and hence in the dar ul-harb, the domain of war).
In fact, the ummah is under constant attack, sometimes
overtly (as in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Iraq) and
often covertly, through the oppression of Muslim countries,
and discrimination against Muslims living in non-Muslim
lands. If one needed to be convinced of this apocalyptic
vision, evidence can be found easily enough. Most
importantly, because Islam is the truth, what-besides a
massive conspiracy-could prevent the flourishing of the
ummah? And what further evidence of such conspiracy does
one need besides the unwavering American support for
Israel's brutal domination of Palestine and its other
neighbors? Or the West's unquenchable thirst for Muslim
oil? Or the ghettoization of, and discrimination against,
Muslims in many Western societies? Even many non-
Muslims in the West admit such things.
From this perspective, it is not too difficult to claim that
the time for a truly Islamic politics has not yet arrived. The
struggle against the enemies of Islam is the sufficient-
indeed the only practical-step towards achieving a truly
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Islamic society. For now, however, Islamic politics is about
organizing for struggle. Here the similarity not just to
Marxism, but even more to anarchism in its revolutionary
mode, is unmistakable: actual, institutional, politics is
deferred and becomes utopian (both very good and very
vague). In place of institutional politics there is struggle,
ideological and sometimes violent, and the limited
organization required by the supporters of the movement.
The establishment of the Caliphate, often said to be the
purpose of Global Jihad, is a rhetorical gesture, a horizon
for violent action, not a political program in the ordinary
sense. Global Jihad is waged mostly in non Muslim lands,
or on the borders of the Muslim world. Those who wage
Global Jihad have made no efforts to name a Caliph, to
persuade the Muslim world of his authority, or to raise him
to power in some Muslim land. "The Caliphate" is a
placeholder, the place to which the world will be brought
when enough violence has done enough work. (The arcadian
visions of anarchists, including the Unabomber, and the
dictatorship of the proletariat in Marxist thought, similarly
oriented violence.)
Putting the sweet by and by to one side, at present
Global Jihad expresses a politics so focused as to have
vanished. If the forces arrayed against the ummah prevent
its flourishing, then anything that can be done to hurt those
forces is a victory. Political Islam's (Qutb's) aspirations for
truly Islamic states have been postponed in favor of radical
neofundamentalism's (bin Laden's) aspirations for violence
per se. Politics is not about creating institutions through
which large numbers of people live among one another and
societies function. Instead, politics is nothing more than the
organization that makes the waging of jihad possible.
Clausewitz has been reversed by bin Laden. Violence is not
an instrument of policy; violence is the purpose of politics.
Bin Laden has done nothing less than create a new form of
politics, and therefore, a new kind of warfare.
As 9/11 spectacularly demonstrated, violence itself,
mass death, is relatively easy to achieve. No durable
institutions are necessary. It suffices to organize just
enough people to cause harm, no more. This minimalism
and resulting autonomy are also new: traditionally jihad
occurred in societies, e.g., the Ottoman Empire, with
armies. While it was always an individual spiritual
obligation, jihad has traditionally been conducted through
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social institutions and therefore constrained by its context.
From the perspective of Global Jihad, however, social
institutions are merely targets, part of the irredeemable
contemporary order. Global Jihad is not socially
constrained because, like neofundamentalist Islam more
generally, it is underdetermined. In principle, anyone can
organize a jihadist group to fight against the ummah's true
enemies (however defined, and often Muslim), and many
such groups have been established, jihad a la carte.
At this point we can see how badly our habitual
understandings of warfare account for Global Jihad. From
bin Laden's perspective, fighting against the United States
in Iraq (regardless of the cost to an Iraqi future?) or
bombing in London are not justified because such actions
are expected to inspire a specific change in U.S. or British
policy. Nor can such actions be thought of as an effort by al
Qaeda to achieve its own political goals; al Qaeda has
almost no politics to express. The members of the Hamburg
cell who participated in 9/11 left Germany for training in
Afghanistan with the intention of waging jihad in
Chechnya. They were redirected to the United States.
Violence against the enemies of the ummah is its own
reward. Which enemies, and what results the violence is
intended to bring about, do not matter. This is not
Clausewitz's "policy by other means," for the simple reason
that the policy has no substance.
As already suggested, Western minds (including my
own) rebel at the effort to think of violence "merely" in
defense of the ummah, which seems perilously close to pure
nihilism or what has rather floridly been called a "cult of
death." After all, violence, we reason, must have a reason,
must be a means to some end. And has not bin Laden made
various political demands (regarding Saudi Arabia, and
then Israel, and then Iraq), and even a few gestures
(perhaps empty) towards negotiation, at least with
Europeans?
Perhaps. If we look at al Qaeda, however, actual
politics-beyond operational organization and
propaganda-is hard to find. Bin Laden has not attempted
to take over a state, not even Afghanistan. He has shown
little interest in institutions apart from those necessary to
his war. Nor has bin Laden shown any sustained interest in
other issues of concern to Muslims, such as health care,
education, or economic development. Even warfare, the idea
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of "making jihad" is unfocused, evidently because the
purpose is struggle against the enemies of the ummah, not
the achievement of specific results. Al Qaeda has made no
real efforts to negotiate, in contrast, for example, with the
PLO. Indeed, much thinking about terrorism policy, e.g.,
regarding captured airplanes, traditionally has assumed
that the act of violence was a move in a negotiation. But
suicide bombing does not work that way. Paradise Now, the
title of a recent movie about suicide bombing, hardly
suggests politics, a decidedly this-worldly activity. In short,
it is difficult to discern any evidence of real politics in al
Qaeda.
But why should this be surprising? Indeed, what
ordinary political goods could a neofundamentalist group
want? As discussed above, the essence of
neofundamentalism is the creation of associations, groups
of people who share codes, not institutions. The near
nihilism of al Qaeda is merely the violent expression of the
political minimalism that defines neofundamentalism. The
fact that bin Laden and other terrorists offer political
sounding explanations for their actions hardly constitutes
doing politics. Just because members of the Baader-Meinhof
gang spouted bad Marxism, or Timothy McVeigh talked in
terms of the Constitution, does not mean that such
terrorism should be understood in terms of its rhetoric, that
the Red Army Faction was about achieving communism or
McVeigh could be explained by the twists and turns of
constitutional thought or history. Perhaps subsequent
research will prove otherwise, but at present the widely
heard proposition to the effect that al Qaeda's terrorism
must be explicable by some ordinary political rationale, i.e.,
that the explicit ideology of Global Jihad may be safely
ignored, seems to be due mostly to habit and lack of
imagination.
Nor do the diverse bands of fighters, many of them
converts or minorities and most thousands of miles from
home, fight to defend an indigenous culture against the
encroachments of modernity. They share little culture in
the sense of the collective understanding and practices of a
people in a particular place. Instead terrorists share a code,
in which violence-directed against the enemies of the
reconstituted, emergent, global ummah-is its own reward.
Global Jihad is not the return of the repressed, that is,
terrorism is not the violent outrage of an indigenous culture
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overwhelmed by modernity. Global Jihad, like
neofundamentalist Islam more generally, is a very
contemporary, even postmodern, phenomenon.
Consequently, while it is to be hoped that Global Jihad will
pass into history, there is nothing about the process of
modernization that makes this necessary. This is not some
sort of aboriginal violence that will subside once the natives
have been properly assimilated; many of the 9/11 bombers
had studied engineering.
What could be a more perfect expression of a politics of
negation than suicide bombing, Global Jihad's most riveting
technique? Although developed as a tactic by Sri Lanka's
Tamil Tigers, who have long been fighting a conceptually
rather conventional war of separatist liberation, as used by
al Qaeda, suicide bombing is a horrifyingly concise
expression of this new anti-politics. If the purpose of
political life is violence, then once violence has been
achieved, political life, life among other people, can be
reckoned complete, and hence finished. In the same instant,
in fact.
It is true that suicide bombing is not purely political.
Jihad has always been understood primarily as a spiritual
struggle, even when it involved physical violence. (It was
widely reported that the 9/11 bombers believed they could
enjoy sins like lap dancing and booze because all would be
forgiven once they had succeeded in killing so many people.)
Suicide bombing is thus-like monasticism-an effort to be
simultaneously this-worldly and other-worldly. Its rituals of
isolating the bomber-to-be, of wrapping him in white, and of
promises (usually kept) of elaborate funerals and
photographs post-mortem help the bomber to understand
himself (somehow more horrifyingly, sometimes herself), as
already gone, an inhabitant more of the next world than of
this.
This point should not be overdone; al Qaeda's politics of
negation remains a politics. Bombers are not completely of
the next world. Suicide bombing is not only suicide, self-
destruction, but also is bombing, killing others. Suicide
bombing is an effort to create as much pain in this world as
possible, that is, bombing is intended to affect others, and is
in that minimal sense political. Moreover, and practically
speaking, the next world is reached through elaborate
planning and organization in this world, that is, suicide
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bombing missions require some degree of political
organization. Suicide bombing is thus undeniably political.
The possibilities afforded by suicide bombing, however,
are vanishingly narrow. A bombing operation limits itself in
time and in scope. Sooner or later the plan is executed or
perhaps abandoned or foiled. The attack may be carried out
or not, but at any rate is over. More generally, while
political Islam rests on intense, even millenarian, hopes for
politics (the Islamicization of society through the establishment
of Islamic states), radical neofundamentalism despairs of
political life in a global context. Through undertaking
Global Jihad, the political wills of radical
neofundamentalists are devoted to death, and hence the
negation of lives that might have constituted a more
durable community.
IV. PRAGMATICS
I have attempted to suggest (i) how bin Laden's
conception of politics and hence war differs from familiar
Western imaginations, (ii) how Global Jihad relates to prior
understandings of Islamic politics, and (iii) how Global
Jihad is a highly contemporary response to the world, in
which the hope for practical politics has been virtually
abandoned, reduced to a literally suicidal defense of an
idealized, and deterritorialized, ummah. If this description
of the politics expressed by bin Laden's war is even roughly
correct, then what are the consequences of this
reassessment of the enemy's politics for the conduct of the
war?
It is of course a little odd for me to undertake this
question. I am an academic, not a diplomat or a soldier, and
I would think that it would be enough to frame strategic
questions in a new and perhaps deeper way, leaving it to
others to do their jobs of deciding on and executing the
nation's policies. But this genre, the American tradition of
pragmatism, and perhaps some human desire for closure,
conspire to demand that I imagine myself in power, and
much worse, that I imagine myself to be responsible, and
prescribe. So lest I seem to duck my obligations, what is to
be done?
Military action should be conducted with a view to its
strategic, as well as tactical and material, limitations. The
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U.S. armed forces have fewer tactical or material
constraints than any military in history. Their strategic
limitations, however, are profound, and flow from the
ideological nature of this conflict. It is difficult to form
strategy around an ideological, as opposed to more tangible,
objective. More particularly, important forces within the
U.S. security community are likely to resist understanding
a very real war primarily as an admittedly abstract conflict
with a postmodern ideology of political negation. And as
discussed above, bureaucracy tends to imagine its enemies
in its own terms, and Americans tend to pride themselves
on their pragmatism, so ideology is unlikely to be taken
seriously. Indeed, rather than take ideology seriously, U.S.
military policy has often been driven by an often
inappropriate expectation of "rationality" on the part of the
enemy, i.e., by the assumption that the enemy will think as
we do, and act accordingly. Both Vietnam and Iraq have
rather conclusively demonstrated that people will fight
even when it is demonstrably irrational to do so, at least as
people like Robert McNamara and Donald Rumsfeld appear
to have understood "rational." To make matters worse, in
efforts to shift the cost-benefit analysis of its enemies, the
U.S. military has found itself escalating conflicts, even at
the cost of collateral damage that harms American strategic
objectives without lessening hostilities. Thus the
understanding of Global Jihad advanced by this Essay does
not stand or fall in isolation. Other imaginations of this
conflict are possible, but not without their own risks.
As also discussed above, ideology tends to be
understood, not on its own terms, but as a means to
conceptualize who the enemy is, thereby producing the
symmetry required for warfare. So one speaks of "the
terrorists" (as once one spoke of "the communists"), which
may be tactically necessary but at the same time represents
a shift of attention from ideas to people. But ideas, too, can
be dangerous, and hard to fight. An idea cannot be killed,
although it may be discredited or supplanted. As a
corollary, this war cannot be "won" in the conventional
sense. Seizing territory or taking capitals may be necessary,
but are ancillary activities. Killing terrorists may be
necessary, but we cannot "kill the terrorists" and win the
war, as President Bush has suggested, because "the
terrorists" are not a stable population of people who can be
identified and then subdued. Instead, the terrorists are
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those who at some point adopt, and act upon, bin Laden's
ideology.
From within the logic of Global Jihad, every action that
tends to threaten the ummah strengthens the logic and
increases the allure of terrorism. The more successful the
United States is perceived to be, the more fighting the
United States seems to constitute a sufficient politics.
Again, Vietnam: once the conflict was with American
military might, then only a truly imperial commitment-
that transformed Vietnamese nationalism into heartfelt
participation in the American empire--could hope to
succeed. Such imperial politics requires the establishment
of an empire, not only conquest but also colonization and
young people willing to die in foreign lands as
administrators, and the United States never intended that
for the sake of Vietnam. Failing to remake Vietnamese
society, the United States assumed the role of foreign
antagonist against whom a politics is defined. Similarly,
and while the analogy is admittedly imperfect, fighting
wars in the Middle East may seem to be efforts to dig out of
a hole.
Such thinking suggests a rather traditional
isolationism, but isolating this conflict is not a real
possibility. Even in the Cold War, even under the spell of
the domino theory of geopolitics, the United States could
leave Vietnam in ways that it cannot leave the Middle East.
Not even in the unlikely event that the United States (and
all other societies?) were suddenly to abandon oil in favor of
other sources of energy, even were the United States to
abandon its support for Israel, global security and
humanitarian concerns preclude allowing the Middle East
to operate outside the security order.
More fundamentally still, Global Jihad is, as the name
suggests, global, deterritorialized to an extent never seen
before. Despite all the talk about Muslim lands, Global
Jihad is hardly confined to the Middle East, indeed most of
the violence occurs in border areas or in non-Muslim
territories. There is no frontier in this war. It is therefore
futile to hope that involvement could be avoided, and that
the Muslim problem could be somewhat warily contained
and gingerly engaged (on analogy with the USSR or
perhaps, now, China) or ignored, even quarantined (on an
analogy with much of Africa). This is a war within
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globalized politics, not just a war of global scope such as the
World Wars or the Seven Years War.
Moreover, the millenarian logic of Global Jihad has no
internal limitation. Absent not only universal conversion,
and the thoroughgoing reform of most of the people who
understand themselves to be Muslims, the global ummah
may always be portrayed as under attack. Once politics is
understood to be the production of violence, the
identification of a threat can be expected. As a result, there
is no policy step that can be taken that will transform the
role, within bin Laden's play, of the United States into
something other than the crusader nation. Our status as
the enemy is required by the logic of Global Jihad. We are
the enemy because we occupy that position in the structure
of radical neofundamentalism. While Muslims, including
radical neofundamentalists, may well be angry over the
actions of the U.S. government, it is foolish to believe that
terrorist violence is some sort of logical response to U.S.
government policy. Terrorist violence is a response to
perceived evil, who we are ("crusaders," or better, "devils"),
not what we have done, as horrible as that may be (what
else is to be expected from a devil?). Devils are to be killed
simply because they are devils. To think otherwise is to see
this war as like wars against a bureaucratic nation state,
i.e., bureaucratic politics by other means. Bin Laden's war
expresses a different kind of politics, and the bureaucratic
calculus does not apply.
The United States likes to see itself as a savior rather
than a devil (although President Bush did ill-advisedly flirt
with "crusader" language). The United States believes it is
not only master of its destiny, but is actually leading
history. It must be admitted, however, that this is a very
American storyline. Within other storylines, we are
antagonists, not protagonists, acted against rather than in
control. From the perspective of radical
neofundamentalism, we are the forces against which world
historical, indeed cosmic, battles must be fought. And that,
too, is a good story. This war is frustrating in part because
it has imposed a narrative powerlessness upon the U.S.
government, to which it is unaccustomed, and which it has
been unable to escape. Seizing control of the narrative-
being able to determine the significance of violence and
thereby winning the war-would be far easier in a
symmetric conflict, but that would be a different war.
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With these considerable strategic limitations in mind,
and while terror remains, wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are
hardly resolved, and we contemplate intervention in Iran
and Sudan, may we hope for more than the ruthlessness
implicit in understanding this war as a clash between an
American version of bureaucratic modernity and the
enthusiastic nihilism of Global Jihad, in which the two
sides have no language with which to talk to one another,
no way to negotiate a peace?
I believe the answer to be yes. My hope requires Global
Jihad not only to be combated by force of arms, but
supplanted by different politics, in which violence in
support of the ideal of the ummah is not sufficient for
political life. Rephrased, Global Jihad will be over when
nobody in the Muslim world believes that the ummah can
be constituted by suicide, when nobody believes that politics
is no more than killing. Perhaps a few remarks can be
ventured, by a very Western theorist, about the forms of
politics that may obviate Global Jihad.
Such politics must be legitimate among the sorts of
believers who today form bin Laden's troops. Therefore such
politics must be substantively Islamic, even though
differences in emphasis and doctrine are to be expected.
A new Islamic politics needs to speak-as bin Laden
and neofundamentalism have spoken-to the circumstances
of contemporary Muslims. As a result, politics must be felt
to be in some deep sense modern, appropriate now. This is
not a war against modernity, as so many pundits have
maintained. This is a war about modernity. Such politics
must be felt to be authentic, rather than imposed on
Muslims from without. Muslims require-and I believe they
are constructing-Islamic understandings of modernity that
render bin Laden's understanding of contemporary politics
a bad dream, and so his war the expression of a nightmare,
evil but also foolish. We are, in short, waiting for a fifth
understanding in the history of Islamic politics, and so yes,
this may be a long war.
What does this mean for the United States and other
Western military and security forces engaged in this war? If
bin Laden's politics and so his war are not organized by
worldly interests, and if the conclusion of this war requires
Muslims to develop and adopt new imaginations of politics,
a fundamentally unpredictable matter, then there might
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seem to be little scope for bureaucratic rationality, the stuff
of modern governments in general, and security policy in
particular. Indeed, neither the U.S. government, including
its military, nor other Western bureaucracies can "solve"
the problem posed by bin Laden, and thus in some very real
sense this war cannot be won by Western military action
alone. So the question becomes how, in this environment,
should governments act? And because Clausewitz was right
that political actions, including military actions, should be
understood as language, then this question should also be
phrased: how should U.S. actions be spoken? How can they
be heard?
Most obviously, the military's efforts to prevent
terrorism, and combat terrorists, will and should continue,
but those efforts should be understood as essentially
tactical. No amount of killing will make the ideas put forth
by bin Laden impossible to hold; no amount of bombing will
make such beliefs any more unreasonable. This is a
struggle with the call for Global Jihad, and therefore must
be waged on the plane of thought and belief, and only
incidentally on the battlefield.
A lawyer and an academic is likely to try and translate
such struggle into a more or less rational argument. But
this is probably futile, merely what I am trained to do, not
what should be done. As I have tried to make clear, within
the logic of Global Jihad, no political argument is possible:
the role of the crusaders is to be evil devils, and to die
accordingly. "We wanted to kill Americans." The struggle
over radical neofundamentalism is not a "battle of ideas," to
be won through the intellectual equivalent of an artillery
duel. Debate teams do not change minds; frontal arguments
are rarely if ever persuasive. Why waste time arguing with
the devil?
The Global War on Terror is inescapably politics by
other means, but the strategic political engagement should
not be with the enemy, the terrorists, at all. The U.S.
conduct of its war should be strategically guided by political
consideration of Muslims who are not in thrall to the
ideology of radicalized neofundamentalism, who are not
enemies, but who may be in a position to develop a new
Islamic politics. Even this is not entirely new to the security
community: during the Cold War, a great many political
activities, indeed entire wars, were strategically guided by
the engagement with those who were not (yet) committed to
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Communism. So while the Global War on Terror will
continue, Global Jihad cannot be defeated through that
confrontation. The struggle with Global Jihad must be won
outside the confrontation with identified terrorists, through
the development of a new Islamic politics that would make
Global Jihad passe.
V. GUIDELINES FOR STRATEGY
I offer four guidelines that can be used to guide U.S.
policy as it confronts Global Jihad. The U.S. government
should (i) refuse to take direction, (ii) be fair, (iii) be
responsible, especially for violence, and (iv) be patient. Let
me specify.
A. Refusing to Take Direction
While Muslims themselves must develop a new Islamic
politics, as we have seen, there are many things that non-
Islamic governments can do wrong. Wars can be fought
badly; reconstructions bungled; people tortured and
otherwise abused; the religion insulted-governments can
open themselves to the charge that they are threatening the
ummah, that this is another crusade, and so forth. The
United States must continually be aware of the danger of
playing the role of "enemy" in bin Laden's play, and thereby
precluding the success of other Islamic understandings of
politics. Whatever the tactical gains in the war on terror
may have been, the U.S. willingness to abandon its military
professionalism and legal virtues has done a great deal of
damage to U.S. strategic interests, which require an
Islamically authoritative politics to supplant radicalized
neofundamentalism.
B. Being Fair
If this war is to be "won," as opposed to merely
contained, only with a fundamental change in political
ideology among Muslims, then the U.S. national interest is
to foster the evolution and development of alternative
Islamic political discourses, in the plural. Without
descending into a vacuous political correctness, "Islam"
should not be understood in monolithic or deterministic
fashion, as requiring this or that form of social life, law, or
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stance. As a very practical corollary, Muslim countries,
sectors of societies, and even individuals must be treated
fairly, i.e., on an individual basis. From this perspective,
the mass detentions at Guantanamo and elsewhere are
disastrous in part because the United States is seen to be
treating all Muslims, without regard to particular
circumstances, as alike (just as bin Laden says). Which is
not to deny that perceptions matter, and the absence of an
institutional connection, e.g., between Saddam Hussein and
al Qaeda, means that the one is irrelevant to another. The
political arena is not a courtroom; Vietnam and Somalia
and the standoff in Iraq all mattered to al Qaeda going into
September 11th. The difficulty, then, is to draw distinctions
fairly, to pick enemies wisely, within an inescapably
interconnected theater of operations.
C. Being Responsible, Especially for Violence
Taking Clausewitz's idea that war is political seriously
means also that war is deeply human, and must be waged
first and last among humans. Powerful elements within the
U.S. establishment have attempted to mechanize war
whenever possible. While mechanization generally has led
to the increased lethality of U.S. forces, killing is relatively
easy, at least for those with sufficient money and hence
tools. But this is merely tactics, as Vietnam and other
conflicts in which U.S. forces achieved a high kill ratio but
did not achieve their strategic objectives should have taught
us by now. Mechanized war, in which a force comes, kills,
and leaves, tends to be unconvincing to those left standing,
because it is politically almost irrelevant. The fundamental
distinction between enemy and ally, those who fight against
us and those who fight with us, is rarely disturbed by
mechanized warfare of the sort favored by Rumsfeld and
others in the recent Iraq war. (Not least of the ironies in the
recent exercises of direct civilian control over the U.S.
military is the fact that the civilians in question are
politically obtuse in important ways.)
Successful military action allows more convincing forms
of political engagement with the defeated enemy. The
significance of boots on the ground, as with cops on the
beat, is that human presence changes the structure of local
society, at least temporarily. By virtue of superior physical
force, new men and women take control in a locality, lead,
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and embody that responsibility with their physical
presence. Society, the forms of human interaction in that
locality, are thereby changed. (Consider, in contrast, a
bombing raid.) Once a local society has changed, so has the
range of political possibility. If the change appears to be
durable, or to cause other durable changes (the adoption of
a new constitutional government, perhaps) then the
inhabitants will change their politics in order to act within
the new environment. This is familiar to military thinkers
as textbook counterinsurgency doctrine. The difference
today is that what was once irregular warfare has become
normal. Insurgency and counterinsurgency, with its
asymmetry, ideological construction, emphasis on the
violent disruption and establishment of order, in which the
ultimate stakes are the support of the people, is now the
paradigmatic sort of warfare. From this perspective, the
very human tasks of what used to be called empire and is
now nation building, albeit nations on the received model-
negotiation, translation, the establishment of order
reconstruction, adjudication, and so forth-are not some
more or less dispensable activities that come after military
engagement. Political change is the only way to win even
relatively local wars, as opposed to postponing or containing
them. The United States has not understood this
adequately in Iraq or even in Afghanistan.
And even local conflicts can no longer be understood
locally, or even territorially. The problem presented by the
failure of the U.S. government to take sufficient
responsibility extends beyond the geographic context of the
occupation of a defeated enemy. The actions of the United
States with regard to Iraq and Afghanistan (and Israel and
Palestine) matter throughout the Muslim world. Much of
the administration's war on terror is secret, not just
investigations, but wiretapping and various forms of
internal and external spying; torture and other forms of
interrogation; judicial and non-judicial processes, often not
only closed to the public, but in undisclosed locations or
denied altogether. International law is often ignored, or,
like domestic law, radically interpreted in order to give the
executive branch the maximum amount of discretion. While
diplomacy and indeed legal process has always required a
degree of discretion, in area after area the U.S. government
has adopted a position of non-responsibility, which makes it
difficult to imagine the government politically, as an actor
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in some broader community. The United States in effect
denies its presence in any such community, while
simultaneously (and truthfully) maintaining that it has
security and other interests everywhere. How are Muslims,
who wish to understand the United States in some way
other than bin Laden's, to argue about a government they
do not know, a government powerful enough to be brazen
about secrets, lies and denials? And so the United States, in
its shadowy absence but undeniable presence, lends itself to
conspiracy theories, to portrayal as the malevolent force
behind the Muslim world's very real ills.
D. Being Patient
People have to discover how they are going to live in
this time true to their beliefs, i.e., how they are going to be
modern. Such discoveries cannot be made for them, and will
come when they come. For the bureaucratic governments of
liberal democracies, not just the United States, it will be
difficult to be tolerant. Although tolerance has long been a
liberal virtue, in this conflict tolerance is required
regarding the substance of liberal modernity itself, as
recently illustrated by the Danish cartoon imbroglio. Put
directly, allowing Muslims to develop new forms of Islamic
politics may require amelioration of certain demands dear
to the hearts of Western reformers. Free speech is an
obvious example, and the rights of women provide other
examples, of areas in which "what is modern" seems so
clear. While women should vote (how could we believe
otherwise?), perhaps coming to that belief, making that
belief central to a politics, cannot be accomplished
overnight. But this is just an example, another question to
be argued and decided elsewhere. The larger point is that
we should be patient. After all, history has waited a long
time for those of us in the United States and other Western
countries to become (what we currently think of as) modern.
CONCLUSION
The policy realignment that emerges out of this
reassessment of the Global Jihad is hardly radical; it is
indeed far more traditional than much recent U.S. policy. It
is true that the Global War on Terror will continue.
Security concerns, and indeed wars, are unlikely to
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disappear, and I am not advocating pacifism. But those
things said, I believe that the strategic interests of the
United States require a substantial change in the nation's
stance towards, and prosecution of, this struggle. The
United States should remember its virtues, rather than
allow itself to be characterized as the demon in a distant
nightmare. The United States should treat other
individuals, peoples, and nations fairly, which often means
individually, which tends to be difficult. The United States
should take responsibility for its actions, not just because
that is the right thing to do, but because it is impossible to
be political without being present. Finally, even in the
formation of foreign and security policy, our governing
elites should be as supportive and patient as possible while
hundreds of millions of Muslims variously and collectively
determine what their modern politics will be like. The
alternative appears to be the rejection of ordinary politics
and its messiness for the sake of violence's clarity, bin
Laden's kind of war.
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